United Nations, New York, 6 May, 2026
Enkhsaikhan Jargalsaikhan
I will briefly touch upon 2 issues: first, on Mongolia’s policy to establish a single-State nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZs) and second, in doing so how to contribute to broadening the role, breadth and reach of zones.
The first issue. Directly connected with its cold war lesson. Situated between two adversarial nuclear weapon states at that time and hosting military bases of one of them Mongolia turned itself into a nuclear target. Therefore, when Russia was withdrawing its bases it declared the country NWFZ and had committed to work to acquire nuclear-weapon states’ (P5) security guarantees. Since 1998 the issue is on the Assembly’s biennial agenda. The Mongolian Government had issued a number of official memoranda on the issue, the latest for current NPT Revcon.
The major challenge for Mongolia was that the concept of NWFZs was based on a group-state treaty approach as reflected in the NPT. Likewise, the Assembly’s resolution defining the concept of zones was also based on multilateral treaties. These were based on the 1970s approach aimed to involve as many NNWSs as possible in the regime. That is understandable. However, the materials of the first comprehensive study also noted that even individual states may establish such zones.
Mongolia’s 1992 initiative was favorably received. However, the P5 were apprehensive that it might establish unfavorable for them doctrinal and practical precedents. 1
After in-depth talks with the P5 Mongolia agreed that until the issue is thoroughly studied and internationally accepted, it could be considered as “a state with a nuclear-weapon-free status”. Based on that understanding in 1998 the Assembly adopted without a vote resolution on “Mongolia’s international security and nuclear-weapon-free status”. In 2000 the P5 made a joint statement providing negative and positive political assurances to Mongolia. Officially Mongolia welcomed the joint statement as a step in a right direction but unofficially it let them know that the statement made no sense since Mongolia pursued a non-aligned policy and maintained good relations with each one of the P5. After further detailed talks, being against conclusion of international treaty by Mongolia with its neighbors, in 2012 the P5 signed a joint declaration pledging to respect Mongolia’s status and refrain from contributing to any act that would violate it (what we call as security assurance lite). More than a decade has passed since, the P5 are still reluctant to welcome Mongolia’s status in the Assembly’s resolutions on the issue. That is why in 2014 Mongolia has suggested to the Assembly to undertake the second study on zones in all its aspects, including on its scope. In short, more than three decades of Assembly’s full support of the country’s consistent policy merits its recognition as a non-traditional zone.
The second issue. The current regime is based on international agreements. However, to make the regime more effective, it needs to be made inclusive. Mongolia is not the only state that cannot be part of the current regime. There are at least two dozen states2, known as non-committed states, that are not parties to international military blocs nor to current or future traditional group-state zones. Due to their geographical location or for some other valid political and legal reasons they cannot be part of the current regime. If recognized and made part of the regime, they would make up third generation zones3, forming its missing important pillar and thus filling the evident structural gap. They would untap the enormous potential of NWFZs based on their comparative advantages.
In this closely interconnected world the role of individual states should not be underestimated since any system is as strong as its weakest link. Politically and legally individual states are undefined grey areas that may play either positive or negative roles for the NWFZ and the NPT regimes. Cumulatively, in their number and territories these states possess or maritime areas they regulate by the UN law of the Sea convention4 are larger than Central Asian or Southeast Asian zones. Growth of the world’s population and increases in basic needs of peoples would objectively require wider use of the planet’s living and non-living resources, including of world oceans and seas, of which global powers are well-aware. How this regime develops depends on the vulnerabilities or comparative advantages5 of non-committed states. To a certain extent that would define global or regional peace and stability.
Aphorisms lupus non mordet lupum, i.e. wolf does not bite a wolf, or that if not at the table then will be on the menu, usually contain fair observation. Another objective factor is that geopolitically time, space and technology are becoming critical factors affecting peace and stability. Therefore nuclear threat might not be limited to actual possession or even hosting of such weapons. Power politics could lead to the resort to technical facilities and infrastructure of even NNWSs turning them into potential technical pawns of proxy wars, as tools for tracking, targeting, homing or in any other way “optimizing” the threat or use of nuclear weapons. No wonder some nuclear weapon states reserve the right to use their weapons under certain conditions or circumstances even against NNWSs or review their NSAs if warranted by evolution of technologies.
All above said, it should also be fair to say that does not necessarily preclude any individual state based on its sovereign right to decide whether to make use of such political or legal support or protection or find other ways to promote its security interests (as the cases with Palau and Micronesia).
What to do. Third generation zones would not be based on multilateral treaties. Instead, it would most likely be based on national legislations or declarations of non-committed states and the arrangements arrived at with the nuclear weapon states. Unlike the traditional zones, commitments on both sides would be softer in tone and hopefully smarter in content, tailored to the regional geopolitical context & requirements, taking the form of codes of conduct. To ensure that the arrangements are transparent and sustainable, they could be registered with UNODA as official recording of the arrangements and institutionalizing their actual status.
The expert group took a comprehensive and analytical approach. It touched upon future zones as well. However due to limited timeframe it might not be able to consider the issue in greater detail. Therefore, it would be advisable to ask a think tank such as UNIDIR, SIPRI or Open Nuclear Network (ONN) to undertake an in-depth study on this issue based on this expert group’s studies and other relevant materials, and report on its findings & recommendations to the Assembly and UN member states in a year’s time.
Coming back to the first issue, based on its wide experience in working on NWFZ issues and with the P5 Mongolia could play a bridge-building role for the third generation zones.
1. The reasons were perceived to be military necessity, flexibility of nuclear deployments and alliance commitments.
2Land-locked, neutral, South Asian and some small island states.
3First generation zones include states with no substantial international problems. Second generation zone include states that have interstate problems or where interests of nuclear weapon states are involved. These two generation zones are treaty based.
4 71% of the Earth’s surface are oceans and seas, if which 15% are EEZs rich in living and nonliving resources. Many small island states are expected to regulate activities of their EEZs.
5Today this notion is not limited to economic issues only. It can reflect relations with some states or groups of states, historical or recent experiences, strategic location that affect commercial or military shipping lanes, etc.
Disclaimer: This article was originally written by the author(s). The views expressed do not necessarily represent the official position of the International Peace Bureau.