Iran’s Resilience, US’s Hubris, Israel’s Malevolence

Author: Anuradha Chenoy, IPB Board Member

The fragile ceasefire can hold only if Israel is restrained and ceases its aggression against Lebanon.

A two-week ceasefire and negotiations announced on 8 April, after six weeks of the illegal war by the United States (US) and Israel on Iran, and President Donald Trump’s threats of a genocide on “a civilisation,” remain fragile as its terms are already in dispute. Iran’s 10-point proposal includes a ceasefire in Lebanon. Israel disputes this and continues to bomb Lebanon. Trump is presenting different versions. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has declared that if Israeli attacks on Lebanon do not stop, then Iran will respond. In this context, negotiations between the sides will be challenging since the demands of the sides appear incompatible. Israel will be a spoiler. So, the truce remains fragile. 

The US’s reasons for the war on Iran included regime change, destruction of Iran’s missile production, seizure of enriched uranium, even though Trump claimed to have destroyed this during the June 2025 bombing of Iran. The US objective in the Gulf is to provide security for Israel and the Gulf and project US primacy. In this war, US bases across Gulf countries have been hit and damaged. The US spent $1 billion a day and has not been able to provide security for its Gulf allies. European allies did not support this war and maintained neutrality. US objectives have not been met, and the war exposed the limits of US power and hegemony.

Israel’s objective in this phase of its permanent war is to occupy South Lebanon, as finance minister Bezalel Smotrich called for Israel to extend its border to the Litani River—deep inside Lebanon’s south (Times of Israel, 23 March 2026). For Israel, this war is the continuation of its genocidal war against the Palestinian people and expanding its borders into Syria and Lebanon. To achieve this, Israel has to destabilise Iran and the “Axis of Resistance,” which comprises Iran’s non-state allies. 

Israel’s objectives remain unmet and so it continues bombing Lebanon after the ceasefire. It has ordered ethnic cleansing and one million are displaced from South Lebanon. Hezbollah, the militia that had removed Israel from its occupation of South Lebanon in 2000, continues to resist Israeli attacks. Israel, however, needs the support of the US to continue this war. Right now, the US does not seem to have an appetite to restart the war on behalf of Israel, as US citizens largely oppose the war and Trump is facing declining popularity numbers. 

For Iran, this war is about regime survival, which it has achieved at a high cost of lives and infrastructure destruction. The ceasefire in Lebanon is linked with Iran’s ceasefire proposal. The Iranian 10-point proposal for negotiations includes non-aggression, continued Iranian control over the Strait of Hormuz (to be shared with Oman), acceptance of enrichment, lifting of all sanctions, compensation to Iran, and withdrawal of US forces from the region. The Iranian foreign minister specifically said that this temporary truce does not signify the termination of the war.

The war so far shows Iran’s resilience. Despite the killing of its top leadership, over 2,000 citizens killed, and battered infrastructure, Iran retaliated regionally across seven countries and showcased its resistance. The Iranian regime did not fall and Iran retains its capabilities. 

The reasons for such resilience lie in the nature of the Iranian state, embedded in its history and culture. Iran is a state in resistance. Its core, the IRGC, is tied with the clergy headed by the Ayatollahs, while the Iranian elected parliament coordinates with the two. The US killing Ali Khamenei in his home, not in an underground bunker, symbolised Shiite martyrdom, which is not lost on the Iranian public who remain mobilised behind the state. His son and successor, Mojtaba Hosseini Khamenei, served in the IRGC, in the Iran–Iraq war, worked in his father’s office and is closely connected to the IRGC. 

The popular 1979 Iranian revolution designed the IRGC as special forces to protect the Islamic Republic and the principles of the revolution. The IRGC is a layered structure with multiple capabilities across Iran’s 31 provinces and is integral to the functioning of the system. It is decentralised, adapted to local environments and operates in low-intensity conflicts with specialised subgroups like the Quds (overseas) force, the Basij (internal security) and the Iranian navy. This is the “mosaic” system, where the IRGC functions as modern guerrilla warfare to counter external intervention. 

Iran blocked the narrow Strait of Hormuz as leverage. Twenty percent of global oil, besides fertilisers and other resources, passes through it. Oil prices escalated ($120 at peak) and threatened global recession. Iran was able to sustain the war since 90% of its food requirements are local. While the Gulf states depend on desalination plants for 70%–100% of their drinking water, Iran relies on traditional water sources and only 3% on desalination. Forty-seven years of US sanctions have made Iran self-reliant where basic needs are locally manufactured. Iran was kept out of globalisation and has no active International Monetary Fund loan or outstanding debt. Iran’s borrowings are from oil revenues and bilateral deals with Russia and China. US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent stated that Washington engineered a dollar shortage in Iran, causing the rial’s freefall that provoked the January protests (Al Jazeera, 13 February 2026) to attain quick regime change after the decapitation of the leadership. This plan failed. 

Iran developed strategic depth over the years by building a network with non-state informal resistance groups (militia) across the region, which include Hamas (Palestine), Hezbollah (Lebanon), Iraqi Shia militias, the Houthis in Yemen and, earlier, the Syrian Assad regime that fell. These are indigenous and autonomous groups and they coordinate with Iranian special forces. They joined the war with Iran. Hezbollah attacked Israel, Iraqi militia attacked US bases, and the Houthis of Yemen committed to support Iran by targeting the key strait of Bab-el-Mandeb on the Red Sea to block shipping lines of the Suez Canal. 

Trump has demanded an open and free passage in the Strait of Hormuz, Iran give up its enriched uranium, stop long-range missile production, and break its contacts with its non-state allies in the region. Iran had earlier rejected these proposals. If the US–Israel insist on these, the ceasefire cannot hold. There is far too much at stake for Iran, as it cannot betray its regional ally, Hezbollah. Iran has been betrayed by the US several times, as they bombed Iran while the talks were ongoing twice before, besides tearing up the United Nations Security Council ratified Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action curbing Iran’s nuclear enrichment. 

The international community has a stake in ending this war since the costs are high globally. The US is in this war to preserve its hegemony and control over oil and oil routes, which give it a leverage over China and Asia, maintain Gulf monarchies and the petrodollar. Israel is in a war for its dream of a greater Israel. Iran is defending its nationhood, existence, and people, and in doing so, defending a multipolar international system. 

The sane world of laws, civility, and respect for civilisation, invested in human security hopes for an end to this war without further damage and hurt. However, there is yet no cause for celebration. The US is not likely to agree to most of Iran’s demands. Israel will play spoiler, continuing the war to gain territory from Lebanon and Syria. Iran cannot give in without fulfilling several of its demands. The ceasefire will hold only if Israel is restrained. The ceasefire and negotiations will require extraordinary will from the sides involved. 

Disclaimer: This article was originally written by the author(s). The views expressed do not necessarily represent the official position of the International Peace Bureau.

This article is also published in the Economic and Political Weekly.